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Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is
uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse oﬀ.
We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being
voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the
existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that
under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better oﬀ. Moreover, in some
cases unanimity rule also makes the proposing individual better oﬀ, even when he has
diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting
rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a
more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the
acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher.
JEL classiﬁcation: C7; D7; D8.
Keywords: Strategic voting; agenda setting; multilateral bargaining.1
1 Introduction
Many collective decisions are made by holding a vote over an endogenously determined
agenda. Examples include debt restructuring negotiations between a troubled company
and its creditors; congressional votes over presidential appointments in the U.S. and else-
where; shareholder votes on executive compensation; and collective bargaining between
a ﬁrm and union members. The voting rules used for diﬀerent decisions diﬀer, and the
choice of voting rule has two consequences. First, the voting rule aﬀects whether a given
proposal is adopted. Second, the voting rule aﬀects the proposal that is being voted
over.
A large and inﬂuential recent literature has analyzed voting when individuals have
diﬀerent information.1 This “strategic voting” literature has dealt exclusively with the
ﬁrst consequence of the voting rule — whether a given proposal is adopted — and reached
the conclusion that unanimity rule is inferior to majority rule.2,3 Speciﬁcally, while ma-
jority rule aggregates information eﬃciently when the number of voters is large enough,
unanimity rule always results in mistaken decisions. As such, when the issue being voted
over is exogenous, unanimity rule is a suboptimal voting rule, and reduces the expected
payoﬀ of voting individuals.
Nevertheless, in practice unanimity rule is employed in many settings. For example,
under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 outstanding debt can be restructured only if
all creditors agree. Likewise, promotion decisions in a number of professions require
unanimous approval, as do the decisions of many international organizations. The
1See, for example, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1998),
McLennan (1998), Duggan and Martinelli (2001), Doraszelski et al (2003), Persico (2004), Yariv (2004),
Martinelli (2005), Meirowitz (2005), Gerardi and Yariv (forthcoming).
2By majority rule, we mean any threshold voting rule: that is, a proposal is accepted if the fraction
voting to accept exceeds a pre-speciﬁed threshold.
3The main exception is Coughlan (2000), who shows that if pre-vote communication is possible and
voter preferences are common knowledge and closely aligned, then both unanimity and majority rules
may allow eﬃcient aggregation of information. However, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) show that
if voter preferences are not common knowledge then unanimity is again the inferior voting rule from the
perspective of information aggregation. Additionally, even Coughlan does not argue that unanimity rule
is strictly superior to majority rule in the standard two-alternative voting game.2
results of the aforementioned voting literature suggest that a majority vote would be
more eﬃcient in such settings.
In this paper we show that the conclusion that majority rule is superior depends
critically on the assumption that the proposal being voted over is exogenous. We do
so by studying the second consequence of the voting rule mentioned above, namely that
it aﬀects the proposal being voted upon. We show that under many circumstances
unanimity rule increases the expected utility of voting individuals, because it induces
the proposing individual to make a more attractive oﬀer.4 Further, in a subset of such
circumstances unanimity rule is Pareto superior, because it also increases the proposing
individual’s expected utility — even though we model his interests as being diametrically
opposed to those of the voting individuals.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the following setting. One individual — the proposer —
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to a large group. The group must collectively decide
whether to accept or reject the oﬀer, and we assume that it does so by holding a vote.
For the remainder of the paper we refer to the group members as voters. The fraction of
votes required to accept the proposer’s oﬀer is ﬁxed prior to the oﬀer (by, for example,
law, contract, or the common consent of group members). As such, when the proposer
makes his oﬀer he takes the voting rule used by the group as given. The main assumption
we make regarding preferences is that the set of feasible oﬀers can be totally ordered,
with voters preferring higher oﬀers and the proposer preferring lower oﬀers. That is,
the proposer and voters have opposing interests, as is the case in many voting situations.
We study the equilibrium payoﬀs when the number of voters is large.
As one would expect, and regardless of the voting rule, the acceptance probability is
increasing in the attractiveness of the oﬀer to voters. Consequently, the proposer faces a
trade-oﬀ between a high oﬀer that is accepted more often and a low oﬀer that is accepted
less often. Equilibrium oﬀers are determined by this trade-oﬀ.
4For promotion decisions, the issue being voted upon is eﬀectively the candidate’s performance over
the evaluation period, which is certainly endogenous.3
As in the prior literature, the group (asymptotically) makes the correct decision under
majority rule but makes mistakes under unanimity rule. In particular, voters reject low
oﬀers more often than they should, and accept high oﬀers more often than they should.
Provided the proposer’s payoﬀ under disagreement is not too low, the mistakes that arise
under unanimity rule beneﬁt voters. In this case, when facing voters using majority
rule, the proposer is not willing to make a high oﬀer, but rather prefers a smaller oﬀer
accepted less often. Since voters make mistakes under unanimity rule by rejecting low
oﬀers more often than they should, the proposer needs to make an oﬀer that is higher
than he would make under majority rule.
Even though under unanimity rule voters receive a better oﬀer from the proposer
(provided the proposer’s payoﬀ under disagreement is not too low), it is still not obvious
whether they prefer unanimity rule or majority rule. The reason is that the better oﬀer
is made as a direct consequence of voters’ mistakes. However, we establish that a form
of the envelope theorem holds in our voting environment. As such one can evaluate
the eﬀect of the higher oﬀer simply by considering the direct eﬀect, which is of course
positive. It follows that voters’ expected utility — as well as the equilibrium oﬀer — is
higher under unanimity rule.
Moreover, and surprisingly, when the proposer’s payoﬀ under disagreement is neither
too low nor too high, the proposer also prefers unanimity rule, making it the Pareto
dominant voting rule. The key to this result is that against a group using unanimity
rule the proposer is able to get a moderate oﬀer accepted with very high probability.
In contrast, as described above the proposer’s best oﬀer against majority rule is a lower
oﬀer that is accepted with a lower probability. In this case voters prefer unanimity
rule because they get a higher oﬀer than they would under majority rule. The proposer
prefers unanimity rule because he can secure acceptance more often than he could under
majority rule at a cost he is willing to bear, due to the mistakes of the voters.
Overall, our results highlight the importance of the endogeneity of the proposal being4
voted over, i.e., the agenda, in the determination of optimal voting rules. While una-
nimity rule is inferior when the agenda is exogenous, it may Pareto dominate all other
voting rules once the agenda is endogenous.
Related Literature
As discussed above, our paper develops the strategic voting literature by endogenizing
the issue being voted over. This literature has studied how diﬀerentially informed indi-
viduals vote over an exogenously speciﬁed agenda by explicitly taking into account that
a vote only matters if it is pivotal, and so each voter should condition on the information
implied by being pivotal. In particular, it is not an equilibrium for each voter to vote
sincerely, i.e., purely according to his own information (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996).
When the number of voters is large, in equilibrium information is nonetheless aggregated
eﬃciently under majority rule. In contrast, unanimity rule does not lead to eﬃcient in-
formation aggregation, and therefore results in mistakes (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1997, 1998, and also Duggan and Martinelli 2001). Given these results, one might be
tempted to conclude that unanimity rule is ineﬃcient, and in particular, hurts voters.
Our results show that neither is true when the agenda being voted on is endogenous.
Our paper is also related to the extensive recent literature on multilateral bargaining.
Most of this literature has focused on proposals that can discriminate among individuals.5
However, in many negotiations a proposal must treat all members of some group equally,
either for technological reasons (e.g., the building of a bridge), or for institutional/legal
reasons (e.g., wage determination, debt restructuring).The literature analyzing this im-
portant class of bargaining problems is much smaller — see Banks and Duggan (2001),
Cho and Duggan (2003), Cardona and Ponsati (2005), and Manzini and Mariotti (2005).
These papers are deterministic complete information models, and as such, informational
issues do not arise. Since agreement is always reached, there is no risk of breakdown
of agreement from having a “tougher” bargaining stance. In contrast, the possibility
5The classic paper is Baron and Ferejohn (1989).5
of failing to agree to a Pareto improving proposal is central to our analysis and results.
Chae and Moulin (2004) provide a family of solutions to group bargaining from an ax-
iomatic viewpoint. Elbittar et al (2004) provide experimental evidence that the choice
of voting rule used by a group in bargaining aﬀects outcomes.
In our model, bargaining takes place under two-sided asymmetric information. The
literature on bargaining under asymmetric information is extensive.6 We add to this
literature by considering how the internal organization of one of the parties aﬀects equi-
librium outcomes.
Finally, in closely related independent work Henry (2006) instead takes the voting
rule as ﬁxed, and characterizes the proposer’s best discriminatory oﬀer. In other words,
he studies the equilibrium proposals that emerge in the Baron-Ferejohn environment with
asymmetric information.
Paper outline
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate the main results and
intuition through an example. We formalize and generalize this example in subsequent
sections. Section 3 describes the model. Sections 4 and 5 establish equilibrium existence
and characterize basic equilibrium properties. Section 6 bounds the equilibrium outcomes
of the bargaining game when the group uses unanimity rule. Section 7 conducts the same
exercise when the group adopts majority rule. Section 8 compares outcomes and payoﬀs
from diﬀerent voting rules. Section 9 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 An example
To illustrate the main results of the paper, it is useful to consider the following example.
A ﬁrm, which is initially wholly owned by a single individual (the debtor), seeks to
restructure its outstanding debt by oﬀering a group of creditors a share of its future cash
6See Kennan and Wilson (1993) for a review. Of most relevance for our paper are Samuelson (1984),
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987), Evans (1989), Vincent (1989), Schweizer (1989), and Deneckere and
Liang (2006), all of which study common values environments.6
ﬂow. If the creditors accept the oﬀer, the debtor continues to run the ﬁrm — in which
case he receives a utility equivalent to $120, in addition to his share of ﬁrm cash ﬂow.
If instead creditors decline the oﬀer, they liquidate the ﬁrm and obtain $100, while the
debtor receives nothing, but derives a utility of ¯ V < $120 from his outside option.
The future cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm (if not liquidated) is uncertain: it is either $100 or
$200, with ex ante equal probability. Each creditor possesses private information about
the relative likelihood of the two valuations. To keep the example as transparent as
possible, we assume the debtor has no private information about the future cash ﬂow.
We relax this assumption in our formal model below.
Assume that the number of creditors is large, and consider ﬁrst the case in which the
creditors use a majority rule. Since majority rule aggregates information eﬃciently7 the
debtor’s choice boils down to the following: either he can oﬀer creditors 1/2 of the future
cash ﬂow, so that they accept whenever the true cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is $200; or he
can oﬀer creditors all the future cash ﬂow, and gain acceptance all the time. Under the








¯ V , while the latter
alternative yields a payoﬀ of 120. Consequently, if creditors use majority rule, the debtor
oﬀers all the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow if his outside option is low enough — speciﬁcally, if ¯ V < 20
— and half of the cash ﬂow otherwise. His expected utility is 120 in the former case,
and 110 +
¯ V
2 in the latter case, whereas creditors’ expected payoﬀ is 1
2200 + 1
2100 = 150




2100 = 100 in the latter case.
Second, consider the case in which creditors instead use unanimity rule. Suppose also
that the most negative signal, denoted σ, received by an individual creditor is twice as
likely to be received when the true cash ﬂow is $100 than when it is $200, and so the
probability of the $200 cash ﬂow conditional on signal σ is 1/3. This implies that when
the debtor oﬀers 3/4 of the cash ﬂow to the creditors, there is an equilibrium in which
all creditors vote to accept regardless of their signal. As such, under unanimity creditors
mistakenly accept an oﬀer of 3/4 when the true cash ﬂow is $100. Formally, voting to
7See references above.7
accept the 3/4 oﬀer is a best response because when all other creditors vote to accept all
the time, being pivotal does not convey any information. Given our assumption about
the information content of the most negative signal σ, conditional on all other creditors
accepting, a creditor who observes σ is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the












× 100 = 100,
while if he rejects the oﬀer is rejected and creditors get 100 in liquidation.
Given that creditors always accept an oﬀer of 3/4 of the cash ﬂow, facing unanimity
the debtor would not oﬀer more than this amount. Moreover, given his outside option
¯ V < 120 he clearly prefers oﬀering 3/4 of the cash ﬂow and gaining certain acceptance
to oﬀering nothing and ensuring certain rejection. Numerical simulations show that
in this example the debtor’s payoﬀ is convex in his oﬀer,8 and so the debtor’s best





225 = 157.5, whereas the creditors’ unconditional expected payoﬀ is
1
2150 + 1
275 = 112.5 for all ¯ V .
Summarizing (see Figure 1), under majority rule, the debtor oﬀers all the cash ﬂow
to the creditors if his utility from the outside option is low enough; otherwise, he oﬀers
half of the cash ﬂow. When he oﬀers all the cash ﬂow, creditors accept with probability
one, while when he oﬀers half of the cash ﬂow creditors accept only when the true cash
ﬂow is high. Under unanimity, regardless of his utility from the outside option, he oﬀers
a fraction 3/4 of the cash ﬂow to the creditors, and creditors mistakenly accept this oﬀer
all the time. It follows that, when the debtor’s utility from his outside option is high
enough (¯ V > 20), the creditors prefer unanimity, but when the debtor’s utility from his
outside option is low (¯ V < 20) the creditors prefer majority. In contrast, the debtor
prefers unanimity when his utility from his outside option is low enough (¯ V < 95), and
he prefers majority when his utility from his outside option is high (¯ V > 95).
8More generally, the proposing agent’s payoﬀ is convex in the oﬀer whenever the signal quality of each








































































Both prefer unanimity Creditors
prefer unanimity
Figure 1: The graphs plot the equilibrium proposal, acceptance probability and expected
payoﬀs. The solid lines correspond to majority rule while the dotted lines correspond to
unanimity rule.9
Interestingly, it is possible that both the debtor and the creditors prefer unanimity
rule to any majority rule. This happens when the debtor’s outside option is intermediate
(20 < ¯ V < 95). The creditors prefer unanimity rule because it delivers a higher oﬀer
relative to majority rule. The debtor prefers unanimity rule because he can get acceptance
all the time at a smaller cost than he could under majority rule — the reason being that
under unanimity rule, creditors mistakenly accept moderately high oﬀers too often.
In the remainder of the paper we generalize this example. In particular, we:
• establish these results formally: A major (and unsatisfactory) shortcut in our pre-
sentation of the example is that we considered the oﬀers made in response to the
acceptance probabilities in an economy with inﬁnitely many voters. Below, we
instead ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium set for a ﬁnite economy, and then take
the limit. Doing so requires us to characterize the convergence properties of the
acceptance probability function.
• establish these results for a fairly general speciﬁcation of preferences: One property
of preferences in the example is that the interests of creditors are completely aligned
(pure common values). In our analysis we relax this assumption by working with
preferences which allow for both private and common values. We establish all our
results for preferences that are suﬃciently close to pure common values. In doing
so, we show that there is no discontinuity at the common values extreme.
• generalize the results to the case in which the proposing agent has some information:
In the example, we assumed that the debtor has no information about the relative
likelihood of the two states. In our analysis below we do not make this assumption.
This introduces a signalling aspect to the game.
• establish that a generalized version of the envelope theorem holds in the voting
game we analyze — even though the voting outcome reﬂects the decisions of many
diﬀerent voters. This step is necessary in order to show that voters prefer higher10
oﬀers in spite of the changing incidence of mistakes.
3 Model
There is a single proposer (agent 0), and a group of n ≥ 2 voters, labelled i = 1,...,n.
The timing is as follows: (1) Each agent i ∈ {0,1,...,n} privately observes a random
variable σi ∈ [σ, ¯ σ]. As we detail below, the realization of σi aﬀects agent i’s preferences
and/or information. (2) The proposer selects a proposal x ∈ [0,1]. (3) Voters simultane-
ously cast ballots to accept or reject the proposal. (4) If at least a fraction α of the voters
accept,9 the proposal is implemented, while otherwise the status quo prevails. Common
examples include simple majority rule, α = 1/2; supermajority rule, e.g., α = 2/3; and
unanimity rule, α = 1. We take the voting rule α to be exogenously given:10 in particular,
it cannot be changed after the proposer makes his oﬀer.
Preferences
Agent i’s preferences over the proposal x and the status quo are determined by σi
and an unobserved state variable ω ∈ {L,H}. The probability of state ω is pω. We write
voter i’s utility associated with oﬀer x as Uω (x,σi,λ), where λ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter
that describes the relative importance of ω and σi. We assume that Uω (x,σi,λ) is
independent of σi at λ = 0, and UL ( , ,λ) ≡ UH ( , ,λ) at λ = 1. Likewise, we write
¯ Uω (σi,λ) for voter i’s utility under the status quo, and make parallel assumptions for
λ = 0,1. As such, our framework includes pure common values (λ = 0) and pure
private values (λ = 1) as special cases. For the most part, we focus on preferences
close to common values: many existing strategic voting papers deal exclusively with pure
common values,11 and it is the natural benchmark in a variety of settings, e.g., debt
9Throughout, we ignore the issue of whether or not nα is an integer. This issue could easily be
handled formally by replacing nα with [nα] everywhere, where [nα] denotes the smallest integer weakly
greater than nα. Since this formality has no impact on our results, we prefer to avoid the extra notation
and instead proceed as if nα were an integer.
10Since our main results characterize the proposer’s and voters preferences over diﬀerent voting rules,
it would be straightforward to endogenize the choice of voting rule by having either the voters or proposer
select it at an ex ante stage before {σi} are realized.
11See, for example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), and Duggan and Martinelli (2001).11
restructuring, where the securities received trade ex post.
A key object in our analysis is the utility of a voter from the proposal above and
beyond the status quo. Accordingly, we deﬁne
∆
ω (x,σi,λ) ≡ U
ω (x,σi,λ) − ¯ U
ω (σi,λ).
Similarly, we write the proposer’s utility from having his oﬀer accepted as V ω (x,σ0),
and his utility under the status quo as ¯ V ω (σ0). Note that we do not require the relative
weights of ω and σ0 in determining the proposer’s preferences to match the relative
weights (given by λ) of ω and σi in determining voter i’s preferences.
For all preferences λ < 1, the realization of σi provides voter i with useful (albeit
noisy) information about the unobserved state variable ω. We assume that the random
variables {σi : i = 0,1,...,n} are independent conditional on ω, and that except for σ0
(which is observed by the proposer) are identically distributed. Let F ( |ω) and F0 ( |ω)
denote the distribution functions for the voters and proposer respectively. We assume
that both distributions have associated continuous density functions, which we write
f ( |ω) and f0 ( |ω). We let ℓ(σ) denote the likelihood ratio
f(σ|H)
f(σ|L), and ℓ0(σ) denote the
likelihood ratio
f0(σ|H)
f0(σ|L). The realization of σi is informative about ω, in the sense that
the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds strictly;12 but no realization is
perfectly informative, i.e., ℓ(σ) > 0 and ℓ(¯ σ) < ∞, with similar inequalities for ℓ0. We
denote the probability of state ω conditional on σi by pω(σi).
Interpretations
Possible interpretations of the model include the following:
(A) An indebted ﬁrm oﬀers n creditors an equity stake x in exchange for the retire-
ment of existing debt claims. If the creditors reject the oﬀer the ﬁrm is liquidated.
Let 1
nUω (x,σi,λ) be the value of an x/n share to creditor i, 1
n ¯ Uω (σi,λ) be the value
of receiving 1/n of the liquidation value,13 V ω (x,σ0) be the debtor’s valuation of the
12That is, ℓ(σ) and ℓ0(σ) are strictly increasing in σ.
13These preferences are isomorphic under any monotone transformation, and in particular, multipli-
cation by n.12
remaining 1 − x share if his oﬀer is accepted, and ¯ V ω (σ0) his payoﬀ in liquidation.
(B) An employer is in wage negotiations with n workers. He oﬀers a wage x, which
worker i values at Uω (x,σi,λ). If the oﬀer is rejected, workers strike: ¯ Uω (σi,λ) is
worker i’s expected payoﬀ from the strike. The ﬁrm’s total proﬁts if the oﬀer is accepted
are nV ω (x,σ0), and its expected total proﬁts if a strike ensues are n¯ V ω (σ0).
(C) A president proposes a policy x.14 The proposal is adopted only if passed by the
legislature. This requires the support of a suﬃcient fraction of legislators from the
opposing party to the president.
Equilibrium
We examine the sequential equilibria of the game just described. The proposer’s
strategy is a mapping from the set of possible signals, [σ, ¯ σ], to probability distributions
over the oﬀer set [0,1]. Conditional on the proposer’s oﬀer, and as is standard in the
strategic voting literature on which we build, we restrict attention to equilibria in which
the ex ante identical voters behave symmetrically.15
Voters are potentially able to infer information about the proposer’s observation of
σ0 from his oﬀer, and thus information about the state variable ω. Since only the latter
aﬀects voters’ preferences, we focus directly on the beliefs about ω after observing an
oﬀer x. Let βn (x;λ,α) denote the voters’ belief that ω = H after observing oﬀer x in
the game with n voters using voting rule α, and preference parameter λ.
A sequential equilibrium thus consists of an oﬀer strategy for the proposer, voter
beliefs βn ( ;λ,α), and a voting strategy [σ, ¯ σ] → {accept,reject} for each voter such that
the proposer’s strategy is a best response to voters’ (identical) strategies; and each voter’s
strategy maximizes his expected payoﬀ given beliefs βn ( ;λ,α) and all other voters use
the same strategy; and the beliefs themselves are consistent. At a minimum, belief
consistency requires that voters are never more (respectively, less) conﬁdent that the
14A judicial nominee, for example.
15Duggan and Martinelli (2001) give conditions under which the symmetric voting equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium for unanimity rule.13
state is H than the proposer himself is after he sees the most (respectively, least) pro-H
signal σ0 = ¯ σ (respectively, σ0 = σ). That is, for all oﬀers x,
βn (x;λ,α)














, for some 0 < b < ¯ b < 1.
Assumptions
Assumption 1 ∆ω, V and ¯ V are twice continuously diﬀerentiable in their arguments.
Assumption 2 ∆H ≥ ∆L and ∆ω is increasing in σi; both relations are strict for x > 0.
Assumption 3 For all λ, ∆H (0, ¯ σ,λ) < 0 and ∆H (1, ¯ σ,λ) > 0.
Assumption 4 For all x, V ω (x,σ0) − ¯ V ω (σ0) ≥ 0 for ω = L,H and all σ0.
Assumption 5 ∆ω is strictly increasing and V is strictly decreasing in x.
Assumption 1 is standard. For future reference, observe that |∆ω| is bounded above
since ∆ω is continuous in its arguments and has compact domain.
Assumption 2 says voter i is more pro-acceptance when ω = H than ω = L, and
when the realization of σi is higher. Since higher values of σi are more likely when ω =
H (by MLRP), the content of Assumption 2 (beyond being a normalization) is that the
“private” and “common” components of voter utility act in the same direction.
Assumption 3 says that the voters regard the worst oﬀer (x = 0) as worthless, i.e.,
they prefer the status quo. On the other hand, there are some oﬀers which the voters
view as worthwhile under some conditions — in particular, voter i prefers the best oﬀer
(x = 1) to the status quo when ω = H and σi = ¯ σ.
Assumption 4 says that the proposer strongly dislikes the status quo relative to the
range of possible alternatives: regardless of the state, he would prefer to have any proposal
x ∈ [0,1] implemented.16
16In general, one can clearly think of a broader range of proposals [0,∞), but with the proposer
preferring the status quo to oﬀers x ∈ (1,∞). The content of Assumption 4 is that x = 1 is the highest
oﬀer the proposer is prepared to make for any pair (ω,σ0). For instance, in our debt renegotiation
example, the debtor (the proposer) prefers being left with any fraction 1 − x of the ﬁrm to liquidation.14
Finally, Assumption 5 says that the proposer and voters have diametrically opposing
preferences: higher x makes the voters more pro-agreement, but reduces the proposer’s
payoﬀ if his proposal is accepted.
Before turning to the analysis of our model, we note that in our framework voting is
the only means by which voters can share their information. When voters are numerous
and dispersed, as is often the case, this is a reasonably realistic assumption. We return
to this issue in more detail in the conclusion. Somewhat related, we also take as given
the information possessed by voters. Other authors have modelled strategic voting games
with costly information acquisition,17 but have done so under the assumption that the
proposal being voted over is independent of the voting rule, i.e., is exogenous. We leave
the simultaneous integration of costly information acquisition and endogenous proposals
into strategic voting for future work.
4 Equilibrium characterization and existence
In this section we establish equilibrium existence, along with a number of characterization
results. We ﬁrst look at voting stage of the game.
The voting stage
Fix a preference parameter λ and a number of voters n. Having observed the pro-
poser’s oﬀer x, each voter attaches a subjective probability b = βn (x;λ,α) to the state
variable ω being H. A central insight of the existing strategic voting literature is that
voter i’s voting decision depends on the comparison of his expected utilities from accept-
ing and rejecting, conditional on the event of being pivotal. Taking the strategies of
other voters as given, let PIV denote the event that his vote is pivotal. Thus voter i
votes to accept oﬀer x after observing σi if and only if
Prb (H|PIV,σi)∆
H (x,σi,λ) + Prb (L|PIV,σi)∆
L (x,σi,λ) ≥ 0 (2)
17See Persico (2004), Yariv (2004), and Martinelli (2005).15
where Prb denotes the subjective probability given b. Observe that even though voter i
does not observe σj (j  = i), and does not know whether or not he is actually pivotal, in
casting his vote he considers only the payoﬀs in events in which he is pivotal, and takes
into account any information he can thus infer.








Substituting (3) into inequality (2), and noting that Prb (H) = b = 1−Prb (L), voter i
votes to accept proposal x after observing σi if and only if
∆
H (x,σi,λ)Pr(PIV |H)f (σi|H)b + ∆
L (x,σi,λ)Pr(PIV |L)f (σi|L)(1 − b) ≥ 0. (4)
By MLRP, it is immediate from (4) that in any equilibrium each voter i follows a cutoﬀ
strategy, in the sense of voting to accept if and only if σi exceeds some critical level. As
noted, throughout we focus on symmetric equilibria in which the ex ante identical voters
follow the same voting strategy. Let σ∗
n(x,b,λ,α) ∈ [σ, ¯ σ] denote the common cutoﬀ18
when there are n voters, the oﬀer is x, voters attach a probability b to ω = H, and the
preference parameter and voting rule are λ and α respectively. For clarity of exposition,
we will suppress the arguments n, x, b, λ and α unless needed, both for σ∗ and all other
variables introduced below.











The acceptance condition (4) then rewrites to:
∆










n−nαf (σi|L)(1 − b) ≥ 0 (6)
If there exists a σ∗ ∈ [σ, ¯ σ] such that voter i is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
the oﬀer x exactly when he observes the signal σi = σ∗, then the equilibrium can be said
18As we show below, there exists a unique cutoﬀ signal.16
to be a responsive equilibrium. Notationally, we represent a responsive equilibrium by its
corresponding cutoﬀ value σ∗ ∈ [σ, ¯ σ].
For use below, deﬁne the function





 n−nα  
1 − F (σ|H)




If Z (x,σ) is positive (negative), and all but one of the voters use a cutoﬀ strategy σ,
then the remaining voter i is better oﬀ voting to accept (reject) the proposal x if he
observes σi = σ. Similarly, if Z (x,σ) = 0 then there is a responsive equilibrium in which
all voters use the cutoﬀ strategy σ.
By the Theorem of the Maximum, maxσ∈[σ,¯ σ] Z (x,σ) and minσ∈[σ,¯ σ] Z (x,σ) are both
continuous in x. So we can deﬁne xn (b,λ,α) and ¯ xn (b,λ,α) that describe the range of





min{x|maxσ Z (x,σ) ≥ 0} if {x|maxσ Z (x,σ) ≥ 0}  = ∅
1 otherwise
(7)




max{x|minσ Z (x,σ) ≤ 0} if {x|minσ Z (x,σ) ≤ 0}  = ∅
0 otherwise
. (8)
That is, xn (b,λ,α) is the lowest oﬀer that is ever accepted in a responsive equilibrium:
if x < xn (b,λ,α), then Z (x,σ) < 0 for all σ. Similarly, ¯ xn (b,λ,α) is the highest oﬀer
that is ever rejected in a responsive equilibrium.
The following lemma establishes existence and uniqueness of cutoﬀ strategies in the
voting stage of the game. Part (1) extends Theorem 1 of Duggan and Martinelli (2001) to
our more general preference framework. Parts (2) and (3) establish elementary properties
of how the responsive equilibrium is related to the proposer’s oﬀer x.
Lemma 1 (Existence and uniqueness in the voting stage) Fix beliefs b, a voting
rule α and preferences λ. Then:
19Observe that xn (b,λ,α) > 0 since, by Assumptions 2 and 3, Z (0,σ) < 0 for all σ.17
(1) For any n, a responsive equilibrium σ∗ (x) ∈ [σ, ¯ σ] exists if and only if x ∈ [xn, ¯ xn].
When a responsive equilibrium exists it is the unique symmetric responsive equilibrium.
(2) The equilibrium cutoﬀ σ∗ (x) is decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable over (xn, ¯ xn),
with σ∗ (xn) = ¯ σ and σ∗ (¯ xn) = σ.
(3) If α < 1 and x is such that ∆H (x, ¯ σ) > 0 > ∆L (x,σ), there exists N such that
x ∈ (xn, ¯ xn) for n ≥ N.
In addition to responsive equilibria, non-responsive equilibria exist. Speciﬁcally, for
any α > 1
n there is an equilibrium in which each voter rejects regardless of his signal,
i.e., σ∗ = ¯ σ. Likewise, for any α < 1 −
1
n there is an equilibrium in which each voter
accepts regardless of his signal, i.e., σ∗ = σ. We follow the literature and assume that
if a responsive equilibrium exists, then it is played. From Lemma 1, as x increases over
the interval (xn, ¯ xn) the acceptance probability increases continuously from 0 to 1. We
thus assume that when x ≤ xn the rejection equilibrium is played, while for x ≥ ¯ xn the
acceptance equilibrium is played. In addition to being intuitive and ensuring continuity,
this rule selects the unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium when x ≤ xn.20
Equilibrium existence
In our environment, the proposer chooses an oﬀer x from an inﬁnite choice set [0,1].
Additionally, the proposer “type” σ0 is itself drawn from an inﬁnite set [σ, ¯ σ]. It is
well-known that sequential equilibria may fail to exist in inﬁnite games, even when (as
is the case here) payoﬀ functions are continuous.
To establish equilibrium existence, we exploit Manelli’s (1996) suﬃcient conditions
for equilibrium existence in a canonical signaling game, in which a single “sender” of
20Formally, for any beliefs b, preference parameter λ and voting rule α > 1
2 + 1
2n, if x ≤ xn then the
only trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is the non-responsive equilibrium in which each voter always
rejects. A proof is available upon request.
Moreover, although when x ≥ ¯ xn both the acceptance and rejection equilibria are trembling-hand per-
fect, the trembles required to support the rejection equilibrium do not satisfy the cutoﬀ rule property we
discussed earlier. Indeed, if tremble strategies were required to satisfy the mild monotonicity restriction
that voting to accept is weakly more likely after a higher signal, then the acceptance equilibrium would
be the only trembling-hand perfect equilibrium when x ≥ ¯ xn.18
unknown type chooses an action, and a single uninformed “receiver” selects a response.
To apply his results, we must ﬁrst show that the aggregate behavior of the n partially
informed voters in our model matches that of a single uninformed receiver endowed with
suitable preferences. The following result does just this:
Lemma 2 (Equivalent sender-receiver game) Fix n, λ, α. Suppose that the pro-
poser makes an oﬀer x and the voters’ beliefs about the proposer’s observation σ0 are
given by the probability distribution ϕ on [σ, ¯ σ]. Then the equilibrium σ∗
n of the voting
stage of the game coincides with the best-response correspondence of a single ﬁctitious
player holding the same beliefs and whose payoﬀ depends on the oﬀer x, proposer signal











Our model is a stylized bargaining model in which an opposing party makes take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀers to a group. In practice, there are many instances in which a group of
individuals is engaged in collective bargaining. In such instances, it is often tempting
to model the group as a single individual. Lemma 2 suggests that to some extent this
approach is viable, but that the relation between the true preferences of individuals and
those of the “representative” agent may be quite complicated. In particular, the utility
function deﬁned by (9) does not equal the average expected utility of a voter in the model
From Lemma 2, Manelli’s results immediately imply:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium existence) An equilibrium exists.
5 Equilibrium properties
We next establish general properties of equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs that we will
use in our comparison of voting rules later in the paper. In particular, we show that
a higher oﬀer increases the expected utility of voters, even though a higher oﬀer also
changes the incidence of voting mistakes.19
We start with the following straightforward corollary to Lemma 1:
Corollary 1 (Change in oﬀer and voter beliefs) The acceptance probability is
continuous and monotonically increasing in the oﬀer x and voter beliefs b.
The heart of our analysis concerns the eﬀect of the voting rule on the proposer’s oﬀer x,
and in turn the eﬀect on voter and proposer payoﬀs. Notationally, we write ΠV
n (x,b,λ,α)
for a voter’s expected payoﬀ from oﬀer x under voting rule α, voter preferences λ, and
voter beliefs b; and ΠP
n (x,σ0,b,λ,α) for the proposer’s expected payoﬀ after observing
σ0. Before proceeding, we note a second straightforward corollary of Lemma 1:
Corollary 2 (Continuity and diﬀerentiability of payoﬀs) ΠV
n (x,b,λ,α) and
ΠP
n (x,σ0,b,λ,α) are continuous functions of the oﬀer x, and are diﬀerentiable except at
the boundaries of the responsive equilibrium range, xn (b,λ,α) and ¯ xn (b,λ,α).
One way that voting rules aﬀect payoﬀs is through their impact on the equilibrium
oﬀer. As such, it is important to characterize how the voter payoﬀ ΠV
n depends on x.
The main complication in doing so is that as x changes the equilibrium of the voting
stage changes, and so the standard envelope theorem does not apply. However, the
envelope theorem can be adapted as follows.
Notationally, for an arbitrary proﬁle of voter cutoﬀ voting strategies ˆ σ1,..., ˆ σn, de-
ﬁne ui (x, ˆ σ1,..., ˆ σn,b,λ,α) as the expected payoﬀ of voter i given oﬀer x. Write
ui (x, ˆ σ,b,λ,α) for the special case in which all voters use the same strategy. Sup-
pose for now that the voting equilibrium is responsive. Evaluating the eﬀect of the oﬀer






















As in the standard envelope theorem, the fact that σ∗






n (x),b,λ,α) = 0 (11)20





n (x),b,λ,α) = 0
for all i, j, x, b, λ, α. So in the pure common values case, one can evaluate the eﬀect
of a change in the oﬀer x on voter payoﬀs simply by looking at the direct eﬀect on
utility (evaluated at the best response to the oﬀer) — exactly as in the envelope theorem.
Moreover, when voters use unanimity rule this argument extends to arbitrary preferences:












In this section we characterize equilibrium oﬀers and payoﬀs under unanimity rule. In
order to do so, we ﬁrst derive the asymptotic acceptance probabilities. We start by
introducing some new notation. Deﬁne xω (λ) as the solution to ∆ω (xω (λ),σ,λ) = 0,
and write xω (λ) = ∞ if no solution exists. By Assumption 3, xH (λ = 0)  = ∞, and so by
continuity there exists ¯ λ > 0 such that xH (λ)  = ∞ for all λ < ¯ λ. Economically, xω (λ)
is the lowest oﬀer that all voters would accept under unanimity rule if it were somehow
revealed that the true state is ω. As such, it is mistake for voters to either accept an
oﬀer below xω (λ) in state ω, or to reject an oﬀer above xω (λ) in state ω.
Next, deﬁne xU (b,λ) as the solution to
∆
H (x,σ)ℓ(σ)b + ∆
L (x,σ)(1 − b) = 0. (12)
Economically, xU (b,λ) is the lowest oﬀer that voters accept with probability 1. For
instance, in the opening example xU (b,λ) = 3/4. By Assumptions 2, 3 and 5, the
lefthand side of (12) is strictly negative at x = 0, and is strictly increasing in x. As
such, (12) has at most one solution. If the left hand side is strictly negative at x = 1,21
deﬁne xU (b,λ) = ∞. Note that if xL (λ)  = ∞ then xU (b,λ) < xL (λ). Consequently
acceptance of xU (b,λ) in state L is a mistake. Moreover, xU (b,λ) is decreasing in b.
Deﬁne P ω
n (x,b,λ,α) as the equilibrium acceptance probability in state ω given oﬀer
x. The next result gives the limiting behavior of P ω
n as the number of voters n grows
large. The result is an extension of Duggan and Martinelli’s (2001) Theorem 4 to cases
in which the proposal being voted over is either very unattractive, or very attractive.21
Lemma 3 (Limit acceptance probability under unanimity) Suppose unanimity
rule is in eﬀect (α = 1). Take any λ ∈ [0, ¯ λ) and voter belief b ∈ (0,1). If the oﬀer
x ≥ xU (b,λ) then P ω


















if x ∈ (xH (λ),xU (b,λ))
.
(13)
The limit acceptance probability limn→∞P ω (x,b,λ,1) is continuous and monotone in-
creasing in both x and b.
Lemma 3 reﬂects the failure of information aggregation under unanimity rule. On the
one hand, failure of information aggregation leads oﬀers above xH to be rejected even
when ω = H. On the other hand, failure of information aggregation leads oﬀers below
xL to be accepted even when ω = L.
Given the limit acceptance probabilities we can characterize the proposer’s preferred
oﬀers. In order to do so, we must ﬁrst show that it is legitimate to maximize the
proposer’s payoﬀ using the limit acceptance probabilities. Mathematically, we must
establish that acceptance probabilities converge uniformly:
Lemma 4 (Uniform convergence) For any ε > 0, P ω
n ( ) converges uniformly over





21That is, in Duggan and Martinelli’s notation, ρ is either non-positive or exceeds 1/L.22
The proof of Lemma 4 hinges on the monotonicity of the acceptance probability in
the oﬀer x. A standard result of real analysis, Helly’s Selection Theorem, implies that
P ω
n converges uniformly when treated as a function of the oﬀer only, x. To establish
uniform convergence of P ω
n as a function of x, b, λ, where P ω
n need not be monotone in
λ, we extend Helly’s Selection Theorem. Details are in Lemma A-2, which is stated and
proved in the appendix.
When voters use unanimity rule, the vote does not aggregate their information eﬃ-
ciently. Because of this, if it were revealed, the proposer’s signal has the capacity to
aﬀect the acceptance probability, even when the number of voters is large. Consequently
the proposer may try to signal his own information σ0 with the oﬀer he makes. As is
well known, signalling games often possess multiple equilibria. Nonetheless, our next
result bounds the proposer’s equilibrium oﬀer regardless of the equilibrium played. In
doing so, we show that even though information aggregation is imperfect, there is still
no equilibrium in which the proposer makes an oﬀer just above the minimum acceptable
oﬀer xH, and voters accept because they think it signals favorable proposer information.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium oﬀer under unanimity) Suppose the unanimity rule





in any equilibrium the proposer’s oﬀer always exceeds xH (λ) + κ when n ≥ N, and is
always less than xU (b,λ) (regardless of n).
Proposition 3 says that the mistakes voters make under unanimity rule force the
proposer to oﬀer strictly more than xH. Given the uniform convergence of acceptance
probabilities established in Lemma 4, it is immediate from Lemma 3 and Proposition 3
that the equilibrium acceptance probability under unanimity rule is bounded uniformly
away from zero when the preferences are close to common values.
Corollary 3 (Lower bound on acceptance probability under unanimity) There




, and n ≥ N, in any equilibrium
the acceptance probability exceeds κ.23
This Corollary in turn combines with Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 to deliver
bounds on the voters’ equilibrium payoﬀ under unanimity rule:
Corollary 4 (Bounds on voter payoﬀs under unanimity) There exists ˇ λ < ¯ λ,



















We refer to any non-unanimity voting rule α < 1 as a majority rule. To state our results,
we need to generalize the xω (λ) notation we introduced above. For ω = L,H, deﬁne
σω (α) and xω (λ;α) implicitly by
1 − F (σω (α)|ω) = α and ∆
ω (xω (λ;α),σω (α),λ) = 0.
That is, conditional on ω there is a probability α that the realization of σi exceeds σω (α);
and xω (λ;α) is the proposal that gives a voter i the same payoﬀ as the status quo, given ω
and σi = σω (α). As such, if the state ω were public information, then an oﬀer just above
xω (λ;α) would be accepted with probability converging to 1 as the number of voters n
grows large. Note that xω ( ;α = 1) ≡ xω ( ), so this notation contains the notation of
the prior section as a special case. Moreover, under pure common values (λ = 0) the
value xω (λ;α) is independent of the voting rule α.
The existing strategic voting literature has established that majority rule perfectly
aggregates information in the limit (i.e., as the number of voters grows large). In terms
of the above notation, asymptotically perfect information aggregation means that the
limiting acceptance probability given state ω is zero if the oﬀer x is less than xω (λ;α),24
and is one if the oﬀer x exceeds xω (λ;α). As such, the limiting acceptance probability
is discontinuous. In contrast, the acceptance probability for any ﬁnite number of voters
n is continuous (see Corollary 1). An important consequence of these observations is
that when majority rule is used the acceptance probabilities do not converge uniformly
to their limit — in sharp contrast to the case of unanimity rule (Lemma 4).
Because of this failure of uniform convergence, it is not possible to ﬁrst analyze the
equilibrium of the limit game, and then to show that it is also the limit of equilibria
of ﬁnite games. We deal with this complication by ﬁrst extending the existing strategic
voting literature to the case where the proposal being voted over varies with the number
of voters. Since there is no reason to require the proposer’s oﬀers to have a well-deﬁned
limit, we state our result in terms of the limits inﬁmum and supremum. We show that,
as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) and Duggan and Martinelli (2001), the aggregate
response of the voting group to an oﬀer x matches that which would be obtained under
full information.
Lemma 5 (Acceptance probabilities under majority) Suppose a majority voting
rule α < 1 is in eﬀect. Take any λ ∈ [0,1], and consider a sequence of oﬀers xn. If
liminf xn > xω (λ;α) then P ω
n (xn) → 1. If limsupxn < xω (λ;α) then P ω
n (xn) → 0.
We next use Lemma 5 to characterize the proposer’s equilibrium oﬀer. First, note
that the acceptance probabilities are asymptotically constant over each of the ranges
[0,xH), (xH,xL), and (xL,1]. Consequently, when facing a large number of voters using
majority rule, the proposer will never make an oﬀer that lies far from the lower ends
of these ranges, i.e., 0, xH, xL. Since the oﬀer 0 is always rejected when the number of
voters is large, and the proposer prefers agreement to disagreement, the proposer’s choice
approximately boils down to xH versus xL. To determine the proposer’s choice between
the two, for any σ0 deﬁne
W (σ0;λ,α) ≡ p
H(σ0)V
H (xH,σ0) + p
L(σ0)¯ V
L (σ0) − E [V
ω (xL,σ0)|σ0]. (14)25
The function W has the following interpretation: the ﬁrst two terms are the proposer’s
expected payoﬀ from oﬀering xH if this oﬀer is accepted when ω = H and rejected when
ω = L. The ﬁnal term is the proposer’s expected payoﬀ from oﬀering xL if this oﬀer
is always accepted. In Lemma 5 we established that approximately this acceptance
behavior is obtained as the number of voters grows large. As we show formally in
Lemma 6 below, it follows that a proposer facing a large number of voters will oﬀer xH
whenever W (σ0;λ,α) > 0; and will oﬀer xL whenever W (σ0;λ,α) < 0.
It is easily veriﬁed that if σ0 aﬀects only the proposer’s information, and not his
preferences (i.e., V ω and ¯ V ω are independent of σ0), then W is strictly increasing in σ0.
That is, when the proposer is more conﬁdent that the true state is H he is more likely to
make the minimum oﬀer acceptable in that state, xH. Formally, there exists a cutoﬀ ˆ σ0
such that W is positive if and only if σ0 > ˆ σ0. By continuity, the same is true whenever
σ0 does not aﬀect the proposer’s preferences too strongly.
Next, consider what economic circumstances lead W to be positive, and so to the
proposer making the oﬀer xH against majority rule. First, W is increasing in xL and
decreasing in xH. As such, W is more likely to be positive if a voter’s payoﬀ relative to
the status quo in state L is low (i.e., ∆L low); or a voter’s payoﬀ relative to the status
quo in state H is high (i.e., ∆H high). Second, turning to the proposer’s own preferences,
W is more likely to be positive if his status quo payoﬀ in state L (i.e., ¯ V L) is high; or
the cost of increasing the oﬀer in state H (i.e.,




   
 ) is high; or the value of having an
oﬀer accepted in state L (i.e., V L) is low.
We now turn to our formal result characterizing equilibrium oﬀers against majority
rule. Note that because under majority voting voters’ signals asymptotically reveal the
true realization of ω, there is no scope for the proposer’s oﬀer to convey useful information.
Consequently the signalling aspect of the bargaining game disappears. The equilibrium
outcome is then asymptotically unique.22
22More accurately, the equilibrium is unique within the class of symmetric voter equilibria, and given
our standard equilibrium selection rule that chooses a responsive equilibrium whenever one exists.26
It follows that when voters hold a majority vote we can precisely characterize the
expected equilibrium payoﬀs of both the proposer and voters. Doing so, however, requires
handling one further technical issue. We must show that as the number of voters grows
large, equilibrium oﬀers and acceptance probabilities converge uniformly with respect to
the proposer’s signal σ0. Our next result shows this is indeed true, even though (as
discussed above) the acceptance probability function does not converge uniformly.
Lemma 6 (Equilibrium oﬀer under majority) Suppose a majority voting rule α <
1 is in eﬀect. Then:
(1) If xL (λ;α)  = ∞  = xH (λ;α), then for any ε,δ > 0 there exists N (ε,δ) such that
(a) If W (σ0) > ε and n ≥ N (ε,δ) then for any equilibrium oﬀer x, |x − xH (λ;α)| <
δ; P H
n (x|σ0) > 1 − δ; and P L
n (x|σ0) < δ.
(b) If W (σ0) < −ε and n ≥ N (ε,δ) then for any equilibrium oﬀer x, |x − xL (λ,α)| <
δ; P H
n (x|σ0) > 1 − δ; and P L
n (x|σ0) > 1 − δ.
(2) If xH (λ;α)  = ∞ and xL (λ;α) = ∞ then for any δ > 0 there exists N (δ) such that
for any equilibrium oﬀer x, |x − xH (λ;α)| < δ and P H
n ( |σ0) > 1 − δ for all σ0 when
n ≥ N (δ).
(3) If xL (λ;α) = xH (λ;α) = ∞, for any δ > 0 there exists N (δ) such that for any
equilibrium oﬀer x, P ω
n (x|σ0) < δ for all σ0,ω = L,H when n ≥ N (δ).
For use below, we set W (σ0;λ,α) = ∞ when xH (λ;α)  = ∞ and xL (λ;α) = ∞.
Lemma 6 says that the proposer will make an oﬀer close to xH (λ;α) (respectively,
xL (λ;α) > xH (λ;α)) after observing a σ0 such that W (σ0) is strictly positive (neg-
ative). As stated, it does not cover equilibrium behavior in the knife-edge case that
W (σ0) = 0. From above, however, we know that whenever the eﬀect of σ0 on the pro-
poser’s preferences is weak enough, W equals zero for at most one value of σ0. More
generally, for the remainder of the paper we make the following very mild assumption:
Assumption 6 W (σ0;λ,α) = 0 for at most ﬁnitely many values of σ0 when xL (λ;α)  =
∞  = xH (λ;α).27
From Lemma 6 it is straightforward to establish the limiting expected payoﬀs of the
proposer and the voters under any majority voting rule. Notationally, we write Π∗P
n (λ,α)
and Π∗V
n (λ,α) for the proposer’s and voters’ expected equilibrium payoﬀs. Immediate
from Lemma 6, we have:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium payoﬀs under majority) Suppose a majority voting
rule α < 1 is in eﬀect and xH (λ;α)  = ∞. Then the equilibrium payoﬀs satisfy:
Π
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From the preceding results, one can see that although majority rule aggregates infor-
mation eﬃciently independently of whether or not the proposer observes an informative
signal, the proposer’s signal does aﬀect the oﬀer he makes. A priori, one might conjec-
ture that since voters and the proposer have opposing preferences, voters would prefer to
deal with an uninformed proposer. However, there are circumstances under which this
is not true. Speciﬁcally, consider the case in which proposer preferences are independent
of σ0, and the cutoﬀ ˆ σ0 at which W = 0 is low. Here, the proposer makes the high
oﬀer xL whenever σ0 < ˆ σ0, and the low oﬀer xH otherwise. In contrast, consider the
oﬀer made by a completely uninformed proposer with the same preferences. The W
function for this proposer is simply the integral of W (σ0) over all possible realizations
of the informed proposer’s signal σ0. Because ˆ σ0 was assumed to be low, this integral is
positive, and so the uninformed proposer makes the low oﬀer xH. From Proposition 2,
it follows that voters prefer to deal with the uninformed proposer whenever they have
close to common values preferences, since the informed proposer makes the high oﬀer xL
at least sometimes.28
8 Comparing majority and unanimity voting rules
We are now ready to compare the equilibrium payoﬀs of the proposer and voters under
majority rule to those under unanimity rule. We focus on cases in which voter preferences
are not too far from pure common values (i.e., λ close enough to 0). As we will see, the
comparison depends critically on the sign of the W function, which is in turn aﬀected
by both the proposer’s and responders’ preferences (see discussion on page 25). One
particularly transparent determinant of W’s sign is the proposer’s status quo payoﬀ in
state L (i.e., ¯ V L). We often refer back to this case, and refer to the proposer as being
more (respectively, less) pro-agreement when ¯ V L is low (high).
Voter preferences over the voting rule
First, suppose W ( ;λ,α) > 0 (e.g., the proposer is less pro-agreement). Directly from
Proposition 4, for any majority voting rule α < 1,
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The ﬁrst term is the voters’ payoﬀ under the status quo. In general, the second term can
be positive or negative. However, by deﬁnition, ∆H (xH (λ;α),σH,λ) = 0, and ∆H is





0 as λ → 0, and so the voters’ payoﬀ approaches their status quo payoﬀ. That is, against
majority rule the proposer is able to reduce the voters’ payoﬀ all the way to their outside
option.
From Corollary 4, the voters’ equilibrium payoﬀ when they use unanimity rule is
bounded away from their status quo payoﬀ Eσi,ω
 ¯ Uω (σi,λ)
 
. It is then immediate that
voters are better oﬀ under unanimity rule when W ( ;λ = 0,α) > 0.
Proposition 5 (Voters better oﬀ under unanimity) Fix a majority rule α < 1,
and suppose that W ( ;λ = 0,α) > 0. Then there exists ˇ λ > 0 such that whenever λ < ˇ λ,
voters strictly prefer unanimity rule to the majority rule α (regardless of the equilibrium
played).29
Next, suppose instead that W ( ;λ,α) < 0 (e.g., the proposer is more pro-agreement).
In this case, the proposer’s oﬀer to voters using majority rule converges to xL (λ;α), the
oﬀer which is required to guarantee acceptance in both state L and H. By deﬁnition,
xL (λ;α) ≤ 1 when W ( ;λ,α) < 0. Moreover, close to common values xL (λ;α) is
approximately constant in α, and so xU (b,λ) < xL (λ;α). When voters use unanimity
rule the proposer oﬀers no more than xU (b,λ), since this oﬀer guarantees acceptance
(Lemma 3). Since voters prefer higher oﬀers (Proposition 2) it follows that:
Proposition 6 (Voters better oﬀ under majority) Fix a majority voting rule α <
1, and suppose that W ( ;λ = 0,α) < 0. Then there exists ˇ λ > 0 such that whenever
λ ≤ ˇ λ, for all n large enough voters strictly prefer the majority rule α to unanimity rule
(regardless of the equilibrium played).
To illustrate Propositions 5 and 6, consider gradually increasing the proposer’s status
quo payoﬀ ¯ V L in state L. When this is low, the proposer is anxious to obtain agree-
ment, and so makes the high oﬀer xL against majority rule. Against unanimity rule he
can obtain agreement more cheaply (by oﬀering xU, for example), and so voters prefer
majority rule (Proposition 6). In this case, voters’ mistakes under unanimity hurt them.
As the proposer’s status quo payoﬀ rises, reaching agreement at any cost becomes less
important to him, and under majority rule he reduces his oﬀer to xH < xL. However, he
cannot reduce his oﬀer against unanimity rule to xH, since then he would be rejected all
the time. Now, voters prefer unanimity rule (Proposition 5), since their mistakes under
unanimity actually help them.
Proposer preferences over the voting rule
We now turn to proposer preferences. In two signiﬁcant cases, proposer preferences
over voting rules are diametrically opposed to voters’ preferences.
First, suppose W ( ;λ,α) < 0 (e.g., the proposer is more pro-agreement). In this
case the proposer oﬀers xL to voters using majority rule and the oﬀer is always accepted.30
On the other hand, if voters use unanimity rule, the proposer is able to obtain certain
acceptance with a lower oﬀer. As such, the proposer prefers to face voters using unanimity
rule. This result (Proposition 7, below) combines with Proposition 6 to show that when
W ( ;λ,α) < 0 voters and the proposer have opposite preferences over the voting rule.
Proposition 7 (Proposer better oﬀ under unanimity) Fix a majority voting rule
α < 1, and suppose that W ( ;λ = 0,α) < 0. Then there exists ˇ λ > 0 such that whenever
λ ≤ ˇ λ, for all n large enough the proposer strictly prefers unanimity rule to the majority
rule α (regardless of the equilibrium played).
Second, suppose W ( ;λ,α) > 0 (e.g., the proposer is less pro-agreement). In this
case, under majority rule the proposer makes the low oﬀer xH. It follows that, compared
to unanimity rule, majority rule results in more agreement in state H and less agreement
in state L. As such, if agreement in state L is socially ineﬃcient, then total surplus
in that state is higher under majority rule than under unanimity rule. Since voters are
better oﬀ under unanimity rule (Proposition 5), it loosely follows that the proposer is
correspondingly worse oﬀ under unanimity rule. However, making this argument precise
requires a further assumption to rule out any gains from reallocating resources from one
state to another. Speciﬁcally:
Assumption 7 Uω (x,σi,λ) and V ω (x,σ0) are linear in x, and Uω
x (x,σi,λ)/V ω
x (x,σ0)
is independent of ω, σi and σ0.
Assumption 7 is satisﬁed in many standard environments. (We also stress that al-
though it is suﬃcient for the results that follow, it is not necessary.) It implies the
existence of a constant C > 0 such that Uω (x,σi,λ) + CV ω (x,σ0) is independent of x,
for all ω, σ0, σi, and λ. In other words, agreement creates the same total surplus inde-
pendent of the oﬀer x — which aﬀects only the division of surplus between the bargaining
parties. Agreement in state L is socially ineﬃcient if
U
L ( ,σi,λ) + CV
L ( ,σ0) < ¯ U
L (σi,λ) + C ¯ V
L (σ0). (15)31
Note that (15) always holds when fully-informed voters would reject even the oﬀer x = 1
in state L (i.e., xL (λ;α) = ∞) and the proposer is close to indiﬀerent between the oﬀer
x = 1 and the status quo (i.e., V L (1,σ0) is suﬃciently close to ¯ V L (σ0)). Note also that
by Assumptions 3 and 4,
U
H ( ,σi,λ) + CV
H ( ,σ0) > ¯ U
H (σi,λ) + C ¯ V
H (σ0),
so that agreement always creates surplus in state H.
We are now ready to establish our formal result. When W ( ;λ,α) > 0 we know that
the proposer oﬀers xH (λ;α) to voters using majority rule, and the voters accept if and
only if the state is H. So if agreement in state L is ineﬃcient (i.e., if (15) holds), majority
rule maximizes total surplus. In contrast, if voters use unanimity rule, the proposer oﬀers
strictly more than xH (λ;α), and his oﬀer is accepted with strictly positive probability
in state L. Since total surplus is lower and voters strictly prefer unanimity to majority,
it follows that the proposer has exactly the opposite preferences.
Proposition 8 (Proposer prefers majority) Suppose that Assumption 7 and in-
equality (15) hold for λ = 0. Fix a majority voting rule α < 1. If W ( ;λ,α) > 0 then
there exists ˇ λ > 0 such that whenever λ ≤ ˇ λ, for all n large enough the proposer strictly
prefers the majority rule α to unanimity rule (regardless of the equilibrium played).
Pareto dominance of unanimity rule
Propositions 7 and 8 give conditions under which the proposer and voters have oppo-
site preferences over the voting rule used by the voters. However, and as we saw in the
opening example, there are also cases in which both sides strictly prefer unanimity rule to
majority rule. The two key requirements for this to occur are that (i) agreement creates
social surplus in state L as well as state H, and (ii) the proposer oﬀers xH to voters using
majority rule. Under these conditions, total surplus may be higher under unanimity
rule, since under majority rule voters reject the oﬀer xH in state L. For instance, in
the opening example both sides prefer unanimity when the debtor’s outside option ¯ V32
lies between 20 and 95: whenever ¯ V > 20 the debtor oﬀers xH = 1/2 to creditors using
majority rule, and whenever ¯ V < 95 agreement in state L generates a social surplus of
at least 120 − 95 = 25. We now establish this result more generally.
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the proposer’s signal is completely uninformative,
and voters’ preferences are pure common values (λ = 0). For this case, we establish:
Proposition 9 (Pareto dominance of unanimity with uninformed proposer)
Suppose λ = 0 and the proposer’s signal is completely uninformative. There exist pref-
erences (i.e., Uω, ¯ Uω, V ω, ¯ V ω) such that for all n suﬃciently large both the proposer and
voters strictly prefer unanimity rule (regardless of the equilibrium played). In contrast,
there do not exist preferences under which the proposer and voters both prefer majority
rule for all n.23
We prove this result in reverse order, and ﬁrst establish that there are no preferences
such that both sides prefer majority rule. When the proposer’s signal is uninformative,
the function W is a constant independent of σ0. A necessary condition for voters to
prefer majority rule to unanimity rule is W ≤ 0: for if instead W > 0, from Proposition
5 voters strictly prefer unanimity rule. Since W ≤ 0, the proposer at least weakly
prefers having xL accepted always to having xH accepted only in state H. He clearly
strictly prefers having xU < xL accepted always, which is possible under unanimity rule,
to having xL accepted always. So for all n large enough, the proposer strictly prefers
unanimity rule when W ≤ 0.
We now establish that for some preferences both sides prefer unanimity rule. Choose
preferences such that W = 0 (in the opening example, this is the point ¯ V = 20). Under
these preferences, the proposer strictly prefers unanimity rule to majority rule for n
large enough, by the same argument as above. By continuity, the same is true if ¯ V L is
increased slightly, so that W > 0. Under these perturbed preferences, the voters also
prefer unanimity whenever n is suﬃciently large.
23Note that Proposition 9 does not require Assumption 7 to hold.33
(Note that when λ = 0, W = 0 certainly implies that agreement in state L Pareto
dominates the status quo, i.e., is socially eﬃcient. To see this, recall that W = 0 says that
the proposer is indiﬀerent between the oﬀer xH being accepted in state H only, and the
more costly oﬀer xL being accepted in both states. If the proposer weakly preferred the
status quo to outcome xL in state L, this indiﬀerence condition would not hold. So the
proposer strictly prefers outcome xL to the status quo in state L, while by construction
voters are indiﬀerent between the two.)
The intuition behind Proposition 9 is as follows. Voters make mistakes under una-
nimity rule, and these mistakes lead the proposer to make a higher oﬀer under unanimity
rule. This higher oﬀer in turn increases the acceptance probability in state L. Because
agreement is socially eﬃcient in state L, overall social surplus is thereby increased. In
contrast, under majority rule the oﬀer that is required to attain the same acceptance
probability (and thus social surplus) in state L is too expensive for the proposer.
Proposition 9 establishes that there are conditions under which unanimity Pareto
dominates majority voting. As stated, it covers only the case in which the proposer’s
signal is completely uninformative and the voters have pure common values. Although
these assumptions greatly simplify the proof, they are not essential. More generally, we
can establish the following:
Proposition 10 (Pareto dominance of unanimity with informed proposer)
Suppose that Assumption 7 holds, and that voter preferences are such that xL (λ = 0) < 1.
Then provided voter information is suﬃciently poor (ℓ(σ) close enough to 1) there exist
proposer preferences such that for any majority rule α < 1, there exist N, ˇ λ > 0 such that
both the proposer and voters strictly prefer unanimity to the majority rule α for n ≥ N
and λ ≤ ˇ λ.
The proof of this last result is conceptually similar to that of Proposition 9, but is
considerably more involved. It is omitted for space reasons, and is available from a
technical appendix posted on the authors’ webpages.34
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed a strategic voting game in which the agenda is set en-
dogenously. We have shown that in such an environment, unanimity rule may be the
preferred voting rule not only of the voting group, but also of the opposing party as well.
These results contrast sharply with the results of the existing strategic voting literature
that has analyzed voting over exogenous agendas.
Inevitably our analysis has neglected some important issues. We focus almost ex-
clusively on equilibrium payoﬀs as the group size grows large. The chief reason for this
focus is that it allows us to establish our results with fewer assumptions on preferences
and the distributional properties of agents’ information. Numerical simulations suggest
that the group size needed for our asymptotic results to apply is not large — in many
cases the equilibrium with ten agents is very close to the limiting equilibrium.
Our analysis has focused primarily on common values environments in which voters’
preferences are aligned. Of course, when preferences are close to pure private values
agreement is very hard to obtain under unanimity rule. Related, to ensure that our
results do not depend on complete preference alignment, we have established all our
main results for the case in which voter preferences are not perfectly aligned, but instead
are “suﬃciently close” to common values. An alternative robustness check would be to
consider the case in which a fraction 1 − ε voters have pure common values preferences,
while the remaining fraction ε have extreme private valuations. In such circumstances,
unanimous agreement would be impossible to obtain asymptotically. However, a version
of our results should still hold when the number of voters is not too large. As we discussed
above, acceptance probabilities converge relatively quickly to their limiting expressions.
We conclude with a discussion of implications our analysis has for pre-vote communi-
cation, i.e., deliberation. In our analysis, the role of voting is to aggregate information,
and no communication is permitted. As is well-known, when voters have biases, full
information sharing during communication is not always possible (see Coughlan 2000,35
Meirowitz 2005, Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006).24 In contrast, when there are no
biases, as in the pure common values case, voters would share their information truth-
fully when voting is over an exogenous agenda. The same is true when voting is over an
endogenous agenda and voters are worse oﬀ under unanimity rule due to mistakes. Note
however that the mistakes often beneﬁt voters by inducing the proposer to make a better
oﬀer. In this case, voters would want to ex ante commit not to communicate ex post
(i.e., after the oﬀer is made).25 Of course, ex post they still wish to change their minds
and communicate, but when the number of voters is large such communication will be
hard to achieve without pre-existing arrangements. As such, our analysis complements
Austen-Smith and Feddersen’s (2006) result that when the agenda is exogenous voters
may not communicate truthfully under unanimity rule when their interests are imper-
fectly aligned. Our analysis implies that even when interests are perfectly aligned,
voters may still not communicate truthfully, because by refraining from communication
they generate a better (endogenous) oﬀer.
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Appendix A
We repeatedly use the following straightforward result. The proof is available on request.
Lemma A-1 F (σ|H)/F (σ|L) is increasing in σ, and is bounded above by 1. Conse-
quently, F (σ|H) ≤ F (σ|L), and is strict if σ ∈ (σ, ¯ σ). Moreover, (1 − F (σ|H))/(1 − F (σ|L))
is increasing in σ, and is bounded above by ℓ(¯ σ) > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: First note that if Z(x,σ) = 0, then it must be the case that
∆H(x,σ) > 0 by Assumption 2. This implies that Z(x,σ) is strictly increasing in σ
whenever Z(x,σ) ≥ 0. In turn, Z(x,σ′) < 0 for all σ′ < σ if Z(x,σ) = 0.
Part 1: By deﬁnition, if x < xn then Z (x, ) < 0, while if x > ¯ xn then Z (x, ) > 0.
For x ∈ [xn, ¯ xn] we claim that Z (x,σ) = 0 for some unique σ, which we write as
σ∗ (x). Existence is immediate, since maxσ Z (x,σ) ≥ 0 ≥ minσ Z (x,σ), and Z (x,σ) is
continuous in σ. Uniqueness follows from the result we have just shown that Z(x,σ) is
strictly increasing in σ whenever Z(x,σ) ≥ 0.
Part 2: To see that σ∗ (x) is decreasing, consider x and x′ > x in (xn, ¯ xn). Since
Z (x,σ∗ (x)) = 0, it follows that Z (x′,σ∗ (x)) > 0. Since Z (x′,σ) is increasing in σ39
it must be the case that σ∗ (x′) < σ∗ (x). By the Implicit Function Theorem, σ(x) is
continuously diﬀerentiable over (xn, ¯ xn). To see σ∗ (xn) = ¯ σ, suppose to the contrary
that σ∗ (xn) < ¯ σ. By deﬁnition Z (xn,σ∗ (xn)) = 0, and so Z (xn, ¯ σ) > 0. By continuity
there exists an x < xn such that Z (x, ¯ σ) > 0 as well. This contradicts the deﬁnition of
xn. Likewise, to see σ∗ (¯ xn) = σ suppose to the contrary that σ∗ (¯ xn) > σ. By deﬁnition
Z (¯ xn,σ∗ (¯ xn)) = 0 which implies that Z (¯ xn,σ) < 0. By continuity there exists an x such
that x > ¯ xn and Z (x,σ) < 0, contradicting the deﬁnition of ¯ xn.





 n−nα  
1 − F (σ|H)
1 − F (σ|L)
 nα−1
converges to 0 and ∞ respectively for σ = σ, ¯ σ.
Proof of Lemma 2: Deﬁne bϕ =
 
pH(σ0)ϕ(dσ0). The equilibrium σ∗
n of the voting
stage of the game is the unique solution to Z (x,σ,bϕ) = 0, provided a solution exists; is
σ if Z (x,σ,bϕ) > 0 for all σ ∈ [σ, ¯ σ]; and is ¯ σ if Z (x,σ,bϕ) < 0 for all σ ∈ [σ, ¯ σ].
The ﬁctitious player chooses σ′ to maximize
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(The change of integration order in the second equality follows from standard arguments,
while the third equality follows from the linearity of Z in b.)
By prior arguments (see the proof of Lemma 1) we know that if Z (x, ˆ σ,bϕ) = 0 for
some ˆ σ, then Z (x,σ,bϕ) < 0 for σ < ˆ σ and Z (x,σ,bϕ) > 0 for σ > ˆ σ. It follows that if
Z (x,σ∗
n,bϕ) = 0 then σ∗
n is the unique maximizer of
  σ′
σ −Z (x,s,bϕ)ds; if Z (x,σ,bϕ) > 0
for all σ ∈ [σ, ¯ σ] then the unique maximizer of
  σ′
σ −Z (x,s,bϕ)ds is σ; and ﬁnally, if
Z (x,σ,bϕ) < 0 for all σ ∈ [σ, ¯ σ] then the unique maximizer of
  σ′
σ −Z (x,s,bϕ)ds is ¯ σ.
This completes the proof.40
Proof of Proposition 1: As established in Lemma 2, it is possible to replace the n
voters with a single uninformed ﬁctitious agent with preferences deﬁned in (9). The
proposer strictly prefers more acceptance (lower values of σ∗
n), regardless of his “type”
σ0 and oﬀer x. Moreover, for any beliefs the best-response of the ﬁctitious agent is a
pure-strategy. As such, the game is strongly monotonic (see Manelli, page 929), and so
possesses a sequential equilibrium (Manelli, Corollary 3).
Proof of Proposition 2: Diﬀerentiability follows directly from Lemma 1. For either












n (x) equals ¯ σ and σ respectively over these regions. For the intermediate case
x ∈ (xn, ¯ xn) we also need to account for the eﬀect changing x has on the equilibrium
voting strategies. The main text handles the pure common values case λ = 0. When
α = 1 and λ > 0, note that for any common cutoﬀ strategy ˆ σ
∂
∂ˆ σi
ui (x, ˆ σ,b,λ,α) = Eω
 
−f (ˆ σ|ω)(1 − F (ˆ σ|ω))
n−1 ∆




ui (x, ˆ σ,b,λ,α) = Eω
 
−f (ˆ σ|ω)(1 − F (ˆ σ|ω))
n−1 E [∆
ω (x,σi)|σi ≥ ˆ σ]
 
.
Since E [∆ω (x,σi)|σi ≥ ˆ σ] ≥ ∆ω (x, ˆ σ) by Assumption 2, it follows that
∂
∂ˆ σi
ui (x, ˆ σ,b,λ,α) ≥
∂
∂ˆ σj
ui (x, ˆ σ,b,λ,α).
In equilibrium, (11) holds. Since ∂σ∗
n/∂x < 0 (see Lemma 1), the result then follows
from (10).
Proof of Lemma 3: First, consider oﬀers x ≥ xU (b,λ). We claim that if xU (b,λ)  = ∞
then ¯ xn (b,λ,α = 1) = xU (b,λ) for all n. To see this, note that when α = 1, Z (x,σ)
coincides with the lefthand side of (12), regardless of n. As such, Z (xU,σ) = 0, and so
Z (xU,σ) > 0 for σ > σ. So certainly ¯ xn ≥ xU. Moreover, it follows that Z (x,σ) > 0
for all σ if x > xU, so that ¯ xn = xU. Given this, the equilibrium for x ≥ xU is the
non-responsive acceptance equilibrium.41
Second, consider oﬀers x ∈ (xH (λ),xU (b,λ)). By deﬁnition, ∆H (xH (λ),σ) = 0. It
follows that for any σ > 0, Z (xH (λ),σ) > 0 for n large enough. So xn (b,λ,α) ≤ xH (λ)
for n large enough. As such, a responsive equilibrium exists whenever n is large enough.
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1−F(σ|L) > 1 for σ > σ, it follows that
σ
∗
n → σ as n → ∞. (A-2)


















i.e., equation (13) with ω = H. The limit acceptance probability when ω = L then
follows immediately from (A-1) and (A-2).
Third, consider the oﬀer x = xH (λ), and suppose that contrary to the claimed
result lim(1 − F (σ∗
n|H))












  nm > 0. Since xH (λ) < xU (b,λ), for m
large σ∗
nm is a responsive equilibrium. As argued above, σ∗







  nm equals the righthand side of equation (A-3) evaluated at
x = xH (λ). However, −
∆H(xH(λ),σ,λ)







  nm > 0.
Fourth, and ﬁnally, if x < xH (λ) then from Corollary 1 P ω
n (x) ≤ P ω
n (xH (λ)) for all
n. As such, limP ω
n (x) = 0.
Finally, we prove continuity and monotonicity in x and b. For x, observe that as
its value increases from xH (λ) to xU (b,λ) < xL (λ), the term ∆H (x,σ,λ) increases
from 0, and ∆L (x,σ,λ) increases and remains strictly negative. As such, the term
inside parentheses in (A-3) increases from 0, and equals 1 at x = xU (b,λ) (see deﬁnition42
(12)). For b, observe that if x ≤ xH (λ), the limit acceptance probability is 0 for all b;
while if x ≥ supb∈(0,1) xU (b,λ), the limit acceptance probability is 1 for all b. For the
remaining case of x ∈
 
xH (λ),supb∈(0,1) xU (b,λ)
 
, continuity and monotonicity in b are
both immediate if x < xU (b,λ) for all b ∈ (0,1). Otherwise, since xU (b,λ) is continuous




, x < xU (b,λ) if b < ˆ b, and





1−bℓ(σ) = 1 at x = xU (b,λ).
Before proving Lemma 4, we establish the following technical result which extends
Helly’s Selection Theorem from the real line to a compact Euclidian space under certain
conditions.
Lemma A-2 Let C = [a,b] × D, where D is a compact Euclidian set, and let gn : C →
I R be a sequence of continuous functions converging pointwise to a continuous function
g : C → I R. Suppose that gn is monotone in its ﬁrst argument for all n, and has the
following property:
There exists a compact Euclidean set S, a sequence of functions sn : C → S,
and a continuous function h : C × S → I R that is strictly monotone and continu-
ously diﬀerentiable in its ﬁrst argument such that, for all n, gn (z) = gn (z′) whenever
h(z,sn (z)) = h(z′,sn (z)).
Then for any κ > 0, gn converges uniformly to g over [a + κ,b − κ] × D.
Proof of Lemma A-2: Given κ > 0, write ˆ C = [a + κ,b − κ] × D. Fix ε > 0 and
choose   < κ such that |g (z) − g (z′)| < ε
4 whenever |z − z′| <   and z,z′ ∈ C.
Deﬁne ψ = min(z,s)∈C×S




   
 , and choose δ ∈ (0, ) such that δ < ψ .
Choose γ ∈ (0, ) such that |h(z,s) − h(z′,s′)| < δ whenever |(z,s) − (z′,s′)| < γ
and (z,s),(z′,s′) ∈ C × S.
Select a ﬁnite set D∗ ⊂ D such that for all z−1 ∈ D, there exists z′
−1 ∈ D∗ such that
 
 z−1 − z′
−1
 
  < γ.43
By Helly’s Selection Theorem, for any z−1 ∈ D the function sequence gn ( ,z−1) con-
verges uniformly to g ( ;z−1). So there exists some N such that
















∈ [a,b] × D∗ whenever n ≥ N.
Choose any z ∈ ˆ C, and n ≥ N. Let z′
−1 ∈ D∗ be such that
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Since δ < ψ , there exists some z′
1 ∈ (z1 −  ,z1 +  ) such that
h(z







∈ [a,b] × D∗. By assumption it follows that gn (z) = gn (z′), and so
|gn (z) − g(z)| ≤ |gn (z
′) − g (z
′)| +
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1 − F (σ∗
n (x,b,λ)|H)





gn (x,b,λ) = P
ω
n (x,b,λ).
Note that h is strictly monotone and continuously diﬀerentiable in x. It remains to
show that if h(z,sn (z)) = h(z′,sn (z)), then gn (z) = gn (z′).44
There are three cases to consider. First, suppose σ∗
n (x,b,λ) ∈ (σ, ¯ σ). By construction,












≥ 0 at σ =
















equals Z (x,σ,b,λ,α,n), and if Z (x,σ,b,λ,α,n) ≥ 0 for
some σ, the same is true for all higher σ (see proof of Lemma 1).
Now consider the case σ∗
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1 − F (σ|L)
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Finally, consider the case σ∗
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1 − F (¯ σ|H)
1 − F (¯ σ|L)
 n−1 
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≤ 0 for all σ, and hence
σ∗
n (x′,b′,λ
′) = ¯ σ.
Proof of Proposition 3: For clarity, we suppress α throughout. Let vn (x,σ0,b,λ)
denote the proposer’s expected payoﬀ from an oﬀer x when he has observed σ0, the voters
attach belief b to oﬀer x, and have preferences λ, i.e.,
vn (x,σ0,b,λ) ≡ Eω
 ¯ V











Deﬁne P ω and v as the pointwise limits of P ω
n and vn respectively.45
We ﬁrst establish that the proposer’s oﬀer is less than xU (b,λ). If xU (b,λ) = ∞ this
is vacuously true. If instead xU (b,λ) ≤ 1, then xU (b,λ) < xU (b,λ) for all b > b. From
Lemma 3, it follows that the oﬀer xU (b,λ) is accepted with probability one no matter
what beliefs voters attach to it. As such, there is no equilibrium in which the proposer
ever oﬀers strictly more than xU (b,λ).
Next, we establish the lower bound on the proposer’s equilibrium oﬀer. We know




xH (λ) < ˇ x < min
λ∈[0,ˇ λ]
min{xU (b,λ),1}.
Choose εx > 0 such that minλ∈[0,ˇ λ]xH (λ) > εx and ˇ x < 1 − εx.








the limit acceptance probabilities
P ω (ˇ x,b,λ) are strictly positive for ω = L,H. By continuity and compactness it follows



















implies that there exists N1 such that whenever n ≥ N1,





Let ̟ = maxω,σ0,x V ω (x,σ0) − ¯ V ω (σ0). From Lemma 3, there exists κ > 0 such that
P ω (x,b,λ) ≤ ε
̟ if x ∈ [0,xH (λ) + κ]. Uniform convergence of P ω
n ( ) to P ω ( ) (Lemma
4) implies that there exists N2 such that P ω
n (xH (λ) + κ,b,λ) ≤
2ε
̟ whenever n ≥ N2.
Combined with monotonicity of the acceptance probability in the oﬀer x, it follows that
if x ≤ xH (λ) + κ and n ≥ N2,









it cannot be an equilibrium
for the proposer to oﬀer x ∈ [0,xH (λ) + κ]: doing so generates at most 2ε over the status46
quo payoﬀ, while oﬀering ˇ x generates at least 3ε over the status quo payoﬀ, regardless of
beliefs. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5: We prove the lemma in four steps. For clarity, we suppress λ and
α and write xω in place of xω (λ;α) throughout.
Claim 1 If limsupxn < xH then liminf σ∗
n > σH.
Proof: By hypothesis, there exists ε such that xn ≤ xH−ε for all n large enough. Suppose
that contrary to the claim, liminf σ∗
n ≤ σH. So for any δ > 0, there exists a subsequence
of σ∗
n such that σ∗
n ≤ σH + δ. By deﬁnition ∆H (xH,σH,λ) = 0; so for δ small enough,
there exists ˆ ε such that ∆H (xn,σ∗
n,λ) < −ˆ ε. Moreover, ∆L (xn,σ∗
n,λ) ≤ ∆H (xn,σ∗
n,λ).
Consequently Z (xn,σ∗
n) < 0. As such, σ∗
n is not a responsive equilibrium; and since
xn ≤ ¯ xn then σ∗
n is not an acceptance equilibrium either. The only remaining possibility
is that σ∗
n is a rejection equilibrium — but then σ∗
n = ¯ σ, which gives a contradiction
when δ is chosen small enough.
Claim 2 If limsupxn < xL then liminf σ∗
n > σL.
Proof: By hypothesis, there exists ε such that xn ≤ xL − ε for all n large enough.
Suppose that contrary to the claim, liminf σ∗
n ≤ σL. So for any δ > 0, there exists a
subsequence of σ∗
n such that σ∗
n ≤ σL+δ. By deﬁnition ∆L (xL,σL,λ) = 0; so for δ small
enough, there exists ˆ ε such that ∆L (xn,σ∗
n,λ) < −ˆ ε. Next, deﬁne
φ = max
σ∈[σ,σL+δ]
(1 − F (σ|H))αF (σ|H)
1−α
(1 − F (σ|L))αF (σ|L)
1−α
Note that the function (1 − q)αq1−α is increasing for q ∈ (0,1 − α) and decreasing for
q ∈ (1 − α,1). Recall that by deﬁnition F (σL|L) = 1−α, and by Lemma A-1 F (σ|H) <
F (σ|L) for all σ ∈ (σ, ¯ σ). It follows that φ < 1 for δ chosen small enough, and so
 
(1 − F (σ∗|H))αF (σ∗|H)
1−α






n is bounded away from ¯ σ, then 1−F (σ∗
n|H) is bounded away from 0. By belief
consistency,
βn(xn)
1−βn(xn) is bounded away from inﬁnity. Consequently Z (xn,σ∗
n) < 0 for n
suﬃciently large. A contradiction then follows as in Claim 1.
Claim 3 If liminf xn > xL then limsupσ∗
n < σL.
Claim 4 If liminf xn > xH then limsupσ∗
n < σH.
Proofs of Claims 3 and 4: Exactly parallel to those of Claims 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 6: We focus on Part 1a. (Part 1b and 2 are proved by similar
arguments, which we omit for conciseness. Part 3 is immediate from Lemma 5.) The
main idea is straightforward: for any σ0 such that W (σ0) > 0, the proposer prefers
oﬀering xH (λ;α) and gaining acceptance if and only if ω = H to oﬀering xL (λ,α) and
gaining acceptance all the time. Given the limiting behavior of voters established in
Lemma 5, intuitively it follows that the proposer’s oﬀer converges to xH (λ;α) as the
number of voters grows large. The main diﬃculty encountered in the formal proof is
establishing uniform convergence: for any ε,δ > 0, there is some N (ε,δ) such that when
n ≥ N (ε,δ), the proposer’s oﬀer lies within δ of xH (λ;α) for all σ0 such that W (σ0) > ε.
Take any ε,δ > 0. Throughout the proof, we omit all λ and α arguments for
readability. We deﬁne ∆ω
0 (x,σ0) ≡ V ω (x,σ0) − ¯ V ω (σ0), the proposer’s gain to oﬀer x
being accepted conditional on ω.
Preliminaries: The ﬁrst part of the proof consists of deﬁning bounds which we will
use to establish uniform convergence below. Choose  , δ1, δ2, δ3 ∈ (0,δ] such that












L (σ0) ≥ E [V



























































































A choice of  , δ1, δ2, δ3 exists such that (A-5), (A-6), (A-7), (A-8), and (A-9) hold









> (1 − δ)V
H (xH −  ,σ0) + δ¯ V
H (σ0). (A-10)
It is possible to choose   > 0 that satisﬁes these two inequalities for all σ0 since |V ω
x |
is bounded. The same argument applies in choosing δ1,δ2,δ3 below. Second, choose δ1

































where (A-12) is possible by (A-10). Third, choose δ2 such that (A-7) holds. Finally,
choose δ3 such that (A-8) and (A-9) hold, which is possible by (A-11) and (A-12) respec-
tively.
Let b and ¯ b respectively denote the most pro-L and pro-H beliefs possible. Fix a
realization of σ0 such that W (σ0) ≥ ε. Deﬁne the following oﬀer sequences, which we
use throughout the proof:
x
H+





n ≡ xH −  , x
L−
n ≡ xL −  .



















































≤ δ3 for n ≥ N3. Let N (ε,δ) = max{N1,N2,N3}. Note that N (ε,δ)
depends only on ε and δ, and not σ0.
Given σ0, choose xn from the set of equilibrium oﬀers when there are n voters.
Part A: If W (σ0) ≥ ε and n ≥ N (ε,δ), then for any equilibrium oﬀer xn, P L
n (xn) ≤
δ3 ≤ δ.
Proof: If xn ≤ xL−
n then P L





≤ δ3 for n ≥ N (ε,δ). Consequently it
suﬃces to show that xn ≤ xL−
n for all n ≥ N (ε,δ). If this were not the case, there must
exist some m ≥ N (ε,δ) such that xm > xL−
m . By Assumption 4 the proposer is always
better oﬀ when his oﬀer is accepted; and so if xm > xL−
m the proposer’s expected payoﬀ is
bounded above by E
 






. In contrast, since m ≥ N (ε,δ), the proposer’s
payoﬀ from the oﬀer xH+
















































where the inequality follows by (A-6) (and the fact that pH(σ0) ≤ 1). By (A-5) this lower
bound exceeds E
 






, contradicting the optimality of xn.
Part B: If W (σ0) ≥ ε and n ≥ N (ε,δ), then for any equilibrium oﬀer xn, |xn − xH| ≤
  ≤ δ.
Proof: First, we claim that xn > xH−
n whenever n ≥ N (ε,δ). If this were not the case,
there must exist some m ≥ N (ε,δ) such that xm ≤ xH−
m . The acceptance probability of
xm given ω is consequently less than that of xH−
m under the most pro-acceptance beliefs
¯ b, which is in turn less than δ2. The acceptance probability of xH+
m given H is at least
1 − δ1. It follows from (A-7) that the proposer’s payoﬀ is higher under xH+
m than under
xm. But this contradicts the optimality of the proposer’s oﬀer xm. Second, we claim
that xn ≤ xH +   whenever n ≥ N (ε,δ). If not, there exists m ≥ N (ε,δ) such that






































which exceeds the payoﬀ from the oﬀer xm by (A-8), contradicting optimality of xm.
Part C: If W (σ0) ≥ ε and n ≥ N (ε,δ), then for any equilibrium oﬀer xn, P H
n (xn) ≥
1 − δ.
Proof: Suppose that contrary to the claim, there exists m ≥ N (ε,δ) such that P H
m (xm) <






≤ δ3, and by Part B, xm ≥ xH−
m and hence proposer’s


























In contrast, under the oﬀers xH+
















By (A-9) the latter is strictly greater, contradicting the optimality of the oﬀers xn.